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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
AND RULES.
This case does not involve any statutes, constitutional provisions, ordinances, or court
rules. Appellants seek reversal based upon the trial court's failure to properly apply common
law.
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JURISDICTION
The Statement of Jurisdiction at page 1 in the Brief of
the Appellants is incorporated by this reference.
ISSUES
I.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law by

ruling, based on its findings of fact, that the Appellees were
not liable for interfering with the prospective economic advantage of the Appellants ?
II.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law by

finding that the Appellees were acting within their rights in
initiating their law suit against the Appellants ?
The standard for review with regard to each of these issues
is as stated at page 1 of the Brief of the Appellants.
The Brief of the Appellants does not cite the record showing where either of these issues has been preserved in the trial
court, and it does not state the grounds for seeking review of
an issue not preserved in the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
The matter before the trial court involved a dispute

between the parties as to: (1) whether or not they had entered
into a contract for the sale of real property; (2) whether or not
the appellees were acting within their rights to initiate the law
suit and to record a lis pendens giving notice of that law suit;
(3) whether or not the appellees slandered the title of the
appellants to the property; (4) whether or not the appellees
-1-

tortiously interfered with the prospective economic relations
of the appellants; and (5) whether or not the appellants were
liable to the appellees for the return of their $3,000 earnest
money deposit.
Each of these issues was resolved after an evidentiary
hearing in the trial court. The first was resolved in favor of
the appellants. The remaining four were resolved in favor of the
appellees.
B.

Course of Proceedings

The Course of Proceedings is as stated at page 2 of the
Brief of the Appellants.
C.

Disposition by the Trial Court

The statement at page 4 in the Brief of the Appellants is
not accurate. Although the trial court did not hear further evidence after the appellants rested their case, there was considerable evidence on the record which disputed the evidence presented
by the appellants and which, together with the insufficiency of
the appellants1 own evidence, provided the trial court with the
evidentiary basis for its findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts which begins at page 4 in the Brief
of the Appellants does not accurately and fully reflect the
record. However it is the law, not the facts, which is at issue
in this appeal. If the appellants had chosen to attack the trial
court's findings of fact, they would have had to marshall the
-2-

evidence in so doing. The appellants have done neither. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, the facts are those which the
trial court found.
The trial court's findings of fact are included in the
Addendum to this Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court should deny this appeal for five reasons.
(1)

The issues on appeal have not been preserved in

the trial court.
The general rule of law in Utah is that appellate courts
will not consider on appeal issues which the trial court has
not been given an opportunity to correct before appeal. Appellants have not cited where in the record they have preserved the
issues for which the appeal is sought.
(2) The appellants have not stated with precision the
relief which they seek on appeal.
Here the appellants fail to comply with Rule 24 (a) (1) ,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This error is relatively harmless and may be remedied in the Appellants1 Reply Brief. Therefore there will be no elaboration on this argument below.
(3) The law as cited by the appellants, when applied to
the trial court's findings of fact, supports the trial court's
conclusions of law.
The Brief of the Appellants ignores these procedural
realities: (a) The trial court held two evidentiary hearings in
this matter; (b) The trial court heard oral arguments and
-3-

considered affidavits in two rounds of cross-motions for summary
judgment; and (c) The trial court made findings of fact.
Appellants purport to argue the law, but in reality they are
re-arguing the facts of the case. However the law is clear, and
the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts as will be
discussed below in greater detail.
(4) The appellants argue the facts without marshalling
the evidence.
Utah appellate courts have spoken at considerable length and
with great clarity regarding the burden of an appellant who seeks
review of a trial court's findings of fact. Here the appellants
present a textbook example of failing to marshall the evidence.
They cite no point in the record which supports the trial courtfs
decision. Indeed, they ignore a portion of the record, the trial
court's findings of fact, which soundly supports the trial court
on legal grounds.
(5) Even if the appellants were to marshall the
evidence, it would support the trial court's conclusions under
the applicable standard of review.
This point is now beyond the scope of this appeal, and it
will not be addressed below in any greater detail.
ARGUMENT
I.

The appeal should be denied because the appellants did
not object at trial to the court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
The appellants allege an error which the trial court was not

given an opportunity to correct. In Porcupine Reservoir Co. v.
-4-

Llovd W. Keller Corp., 392 P.2d 620, 621; 15 Utah 2d 318 (1964),
this Court stated:
The duty is encumbent upon counsel to give the trial
court the opportunity to correct the error before
asking the appellate court to reverse a verdict and
judgment thereon.
Now the appellants ask this Court to find error without
having challenged at trial the findings and conclusions which are
under attack. Here, as in Porcupine Reservoir Co., this Court
should deny the appeal and affirm the decision of the trial
court.
II.

The trial court correctly applied the law, relying on
factual findings that: (a) Appellees recorded the lis
pendens in good faith and upon the advice of counsel;
(b) Appellees acted to preserve what they believed to
be their right to pursue the remedy of specific
performance; (c) Appellees did not act for an improper
purpose or by an improper means; and (d) Appellees were
acting within their rights in initiating the law suit.
Appellants get off on the wrong foot by casting the first of

their two issues in terms of whether or not they had established
a prima facie case of wrongful interference. See Brief of the
Appellants, p. 1.

Here they confuse a dismissal under Rule 41

(b) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, with what we have in this
case, a decision by the trial court on the merits. See Sorensen
v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah App.
1994). Perhaps this misdirection accounts for the appellants1
failure to consider the trial court's findings of fact with its
conclusions of law.
Appellants correctly rely on Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co.
v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) in setting forth the law which
-5-

applies in this case. In Leigh Furniture this Court noted the requirement that good faith must be absent for tortious conduct to
be present. See Id. at 3 08 cited at page 10 in the Brief of the
Appellants. However, the appellants disregard the finding of the
trial court that appellees acted in good faith. See Addendum,
Finding 7.
Again appellants correctly rely on GS Enterprises v.
Falmouth Marine, 571 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1991) in noting the need
to focus on whether or not there existed a genuine dispute and
probable cause to believe that the suit would succeed. See Brief
of the Appellants, pp 14-15. However, the appellants disregard
the finding of the trial court that the appellees acted within
their rights in filing the law suit. See Addendum, Finding 11.
Also it f s difficult to second guess the trial court's finding
that the appellees did not act for an improper purpose or by an
improper means if one recalls that the trial court found the parties 1 agreement to be ambiguous and that the trial court needed
to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the parties1
intent.
Above all else, it's a challenge to imagine that the appellants argue there was not dispute and that probable cause was
lacking when the appellants retained the $3000.00 earnest money
deposit of the appellees while arguing, and with the trial court
agreeing, that no contract existed. This the appellants contended
while now they continue to allege in the brief that the Appellees
"backed out of and cancelled" their purchase agreement. See Brief
-6-

of the Appellants, p. 16.
III.

Utah law prohibits the appellants from
facts without marshalling the evidence.

arguing

the

Utah law with regard the failure by an appellant to take
into account a trial court's findings of fact is stated in no
uncertain terms by this Court in Matter of Estate of Beesley,
883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994). There this Court found that the
findings of fact by the trial court were sufficient to support
its conclusions of law. This Court went on to state:
Again, to successfully challenge findings such as
these,
an appellant must first marshall all of the
evidence that supports the findings and
then
demonstrate that even in viewing it in the light most
favorable to the ... [trial] court, the evidence is
insufficient to support the finding. Id.
In an earlier case, this Court sustained the findings and
conclusions of a trial court, reasoning as follows:
...[Appellant's] brief presents the conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to his position and
largely ignores the contrary evidence. Therefore,
there is no reason for us to disturb the trial court's
findings. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-9
(Utah 1989).
A fortiori, in the case now before this Court, the decision of
the trial court should be affirmed because the Brief of the
Appellants ignores all of the evidence which is contrary to its
position.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the appeal should be denied and the decision of the trial court affirmed. Additionally, appellees ask
that this Court order the appellants to pay appellees1 costs,
including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred in defending
-7-

against this appeal.
DATED this 12th day of Octa

Thomas
for Plainti

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that this Brief of Appellees was served upon the
Appellants on this 12th day of October, 1995, by mailing,
postage pre-paid, true copies of it to Stephen B. Elggren,
Elggren & Van Dyke, 2469 EagLt^Fort Union Blvd. #2 02,
City, UT 84121.
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Thomas F. Rogan (4506)
Attorney for A. Carter Davis and
Shirleen C. Davis
136 South Main Street, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: 8 01-355-04 61
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

A. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C.
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE,
Plaintiffs

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

-vsIDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST,
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY
Defendants
IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST,
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs

Case 930902664PR
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

-vsA. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C.
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE,
Counterclaim Defendants
Before coming to trial on May 5, 1995, the Court addressed substantive issues raised in this matter on two
occasions: the first, by Minute Entry on January 18, 1995,
after having determined that the Earnest Money Sales Agreement of Mr, Huish and Mr, and Mrs. Davis was ambiguous on
its face and after having received extrinsic evidence at
-1-

a hearing on December 10, 1994, to resolve the ambiguity of
the Agreement; and the second, ruling on Defendants7 Motion
for Summary Judgment by granting partial declaratory relief
to quiet title based on the Court's January Minute Entry.
Now having considered further evidence at trial on
May 5, 1995, the Court enters Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follow.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court provided the parties an with ex-

pedited hearing on December 10, 1994, to consider extrinsic
evidence in an effort to resolve the ambiguous Earnest
Money Sales Agreement ("the Agreement") between Mr. Huish
and Mr. and Mrs. Davis.
2.

The evidence presented at the hearing

showed that the parties had substantially different understandings with regard to the price which would be paid
for the property which was the subject of the Agreement
and thus failed to resolve the ambiguity of the Agreement.
3.

The payment terms and price to be paid for

the property were material elements of the parties' Agreement.
4.

Given the lack of agreement on these mater-

ial elements, there was no meeting of the minds between
the parties to the Agreement.
5.

On May 12, 1993, Mr. and Mrs. Davis through

counsel filed suit and recorded with the Office of the Salt
-2-

Lake County Recorder a Lis Pendens giving notice of the
pendency of this action and the relief sought by them.
6.

On May 21, 1993, Mr- Huish through counsel

demanded under Utah Code Section 38-9-1 that the plaintiffs remove the Lis Pendens,
7•

The Plaintiffs recorded the Lis Pendens

in good faith and upon the advice of counsel to preserve
what they believed to be their right to pursue the remedy
of specific performance under the Agreement.
8.

The Plaintiffs intentionally filed this

law suit and recorded the Lis Pendens.
9•

The recording of the Lis Pendens inter-

fered with the prospective economic relations of the
Defendants,
10.

The Plaintiffs did not act for an improper

purpose or by an improper means when they filed the law
suit or recorded the Lis Pendens.
11.

The Plaintiffs were acting within their

rights by initiating this law suit.
12.

The Plaintiffs deposited $3,000 as earnest

money under their Agreement with Mr. Huish.
14.

By the terms of the Agreement, Mr. Huish

was to return the $3,000 deposit to the Plaintiffs if
they were unable to complete the transaction under the
terms of the Agreement deemed ambiguous by the Court.
15.

Mr. Huish has not returned the $3,000

earnest money deposit to the Plaintiffs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
(a)

As previously determined by the Court:

the Agreement between Mr. Huish and Mr. and Mrs.
Davis is ambiguous on its face;

(b)

there was no contract between Mr. Huish and Mr.
and Mrs. Davis; and

(c)

title has been quieted in favor of Mr. Huish.
2.

Mr. and Mrs. Davis have not slandered

Defendants7 title to the property.
3.

Mr. and Mrs. Davis are not liable for

interfering with the prospective economic advantage
of the Defendants.
4.

Mr. and Mrs. Davis are not liable to

the Defendants' by reason of their having filed this
law suit.
5.

The Defendants are not entitled to recover

damages from Mr. and Mrs. Davis.
6.

However, Mr. and Mrs Davis are entitled to

recover from the Defendants their $3,000 earnest money
which has not been returned to them.
DATED this

j- J

day of May, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

Tyrone E. Medley
District Judge
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